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Abstract :
This paper investigates whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to discipline incumbent
management. Shapley values capturing the relative power of shareholder coalitions by category of owner, outperform
models with percentage ownership stakes and models measuring the relative voting power of individual owners. There
is evidence of successful executive director resistance to board restructuring if these executive directors can combine
their ownership stakes to a substantial block of voting power. Non-executive directors seem to support incumbent
management, but poor performance is penalised by industrial and commercial companies with large relative voting
power. The voting power of insurance companies is positively related to executive director turnover, but this voting
power is used for remove management for reasons of other than performance, which may be of strategic nature.
Investment/pension funds and funds managed by banks do not play a role in the management substitution process.
A large number of share blocks change hands, and new shareholders –industrial companies, individuals and families–
are related to increased executive director turnover. Still, these changes in share stakes do not constitute a market in
(partial) control since there is no systematic evidence that these changes are triggered by poor performance with the
notable exception of industrial companies. There is little evidence that adjusting the board composition to allow for
more independence for non-executive directors leads to higher managerial removal. In contrast, high gearing
facilitates substitution of executive directors, especially if the company needs to be refinanced.
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1. Introduction : separating ownership and control.
A dichotomy: market versus blockholder system.
Traditionally, corporate governance systems in western economies have been categorised into a
market oriented system and a blockholder system
1. The former is typical for Anglo-American
countries with a large number of listed companies, strong boards, prevalence of institutional
investors (Roe 1994) and high trading liquidity of shares (Becht and Roell 1999). The blockholder
system refers to Continental European countries and Japan which have a (relatively) small number
of listed companies, concentrated ownership, complex cascade-like shareholding structures with
powerful controlling families, industrial firms or holding companies (Barca and Becht 2000). Table
A1 (appendix) shows that the cumulative shareholdings of the largest three shareholders largely
exceed the absolute majority threshold in most Continental European countries. In Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, a majority of shares in the average quoted company is even
controlled (directly and indirectly) by one single investor (group). In contrast, the largest share stake
in Anglo-American countries amounts to less than 15%. In 85% of the listed companies, the largest
shareholder does not even control a blocking minority (of 25% or more) and a coalition of the
largest three shareholders still holds less than 30%.
This dichotomy has important consequences at the level of agency costs (see a.o. Shleifer and
Vishny 1997). Due to free riding of control, dispersed concentration of ownership and voting rights
might lead to low levels of monitoring and consequently to a balance of power tilted towards
management. Still, the lack of shareholder monitoring may be compensated by an active take-over
market.
2 In contrast, high levels of concentrated ownership and voting rights enhance monitoring
since control is obtained by one large shareholder group, but agency conflicts may arise between
majority and minority shareholders.
Deviations from the traditional market versus blockholder framework.
The dichotomy between market oriented and blockholder systems is but an oversimplification of
control allocation. Firstly, it is not just mere ownership concentration which has important
monitoring repercussions but rather the nature of shareholding concentration. Specific categories of
owners have different monitoring abilities: e.g corporate shareholders may value dominant
shareholding positions not just for a financial return on investment, but also for potential benefits of
control, especially when a customer or supplier relation exists with the target company (Barclay and
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Holderness, 1989). Table A2 (appendix) shows the variation of voting power among the main
investor categories by country. Whereas domestic industrial and commercial companies are the
main shareholders in Germany, Austria and Italy, financial holding companies dominate in France
and Belgium. Banking groups are powerful in France and Germany. A substantial number of
companies is controlled by wealthy families in Belgium and Italy. In Anglo-American countries, the
majority of shares is held by institutions.
The evidence of large shareholder assuming monitoring responsibilities in the blockholder system is
mixed. French, Belgian or Italian listed holding companies do not actively monitor listed
companies, as reflected in managerial disciplining or superior corporate performance (see Banerjee
et al. 1997 for France, Renneboog 2000 for Belgium, and Bianco and Casavola 1999 for Italy). In
contrast, there is some weak evidence that listed industrial companies in these countries are well
monitored and, in turn, discipline companies in which they hold a large equity participation. Kaplan
(1994) and Crespi and Garcia (1999) find limited evidence of beneficial monitoring consequences
for German and Spanish listed companies. In contrast, Kaplan and Minton (1997) conclude that
changes are implemented to the board structure of poorly performing Japanese companies which
belong to a keiretsu group. For the US, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Bethel et al. (1998)
found substantial management turnover associated with majority blocks trade. In contrast, Franks et
al. (1999) conclude that large shareholders – with the exception of industrial companies – do not
seem to discipline listed poorly performing UK companies but find strong evidence of managerial
entrenchment. In Anglo-American countries, much is expected from institutional shareholders in
terms of corporate control (e.g. Black 1990, Gilson and Kraakman 1991). Still, in spite of the
dominance of this investor class, there is little evidence –with some notable exceptions like
CalPERS or LENS- that institutions have accepted an active governance active role (Stapledon
1996 for UK, Romano 1999 for US).
A second reason explaining the weak relation between ownership concentration (as a percentage of
equity) and monitoring (managerial disciplining) is that ownership concentration is not necessarily
congruent with concentration of voting rights and hence control. Deviations from correspondence
between concentration of cash flow rights and of voting rights are induced by dual class shares.
The value of control can be derived from the (control) premium of voting shares.
3 Whereas dual
                                                                                                                                                                                       
2 Whereas Martin and McConnell (1991) show that the market for hostile take-overs in the US fulfils this disciplinary
role in the US, Franks and Mayer (1996) do not find evidence supporting this role in the UK.
3 The control premium is the US is small as concluded in Lease et al. (1983, 1984), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)
and Zingales (1995) but increases when control is contested. The average voting premium is higher in other countries:
6.5% for Sweden (Rydqvist 1987), 82% or 69% in Italy (respectively, Zingales 1994 and Nicodamo 1998), 45.5% in
Israel (Levy 1982), 20% for Switzerland (Horner 1988) and 5% for France (Banerjee et al 1997).United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 3
class shares are common in e.g. Sweden and Italy, in other countries, like the UK, dual class shares
are not allowed or are discouraged by the regulatory authorities
4. Ownership pyramids or cascades
enable investors to ensure (full) control over a company while holding less than 50% of the cash
flow rights.
5 The longer the chain of intermediate holding companies and the higher the deviation
from full intermediate ownership, the higher the discrepancy between ownership and control. This
pyramiding technique is common in Continental Europe (especially in Belgium, France and Italy).
6
Another way of accumulating voting power is through proxy votes. For example, German banks
commonly use proxy votes of the shares deposited in their custody (Depotstimmrecht, Wenger and
Kaserer, 1997) and the management of UK firms are often soliciting proxy votes to support
propositions on the annual meeting (Stapledon, 1996). Voting pacts often take the form of priority
purchase rights of share blocks or are instrumental in forming investor groups in e.g. Belgium
(Becht et al. 1998) and Germany (Franks and Mayer 1998).
Whereas, above mechanisms allow control retention (or accumulation) with limited equity
ownership, there are also mechanisms eroding voting power. For example, a majority of Dutch
listed companies have adopted the ‘structured regime’ which induces complete ownership and
control separation as voting rights are held by the Administration Office controlled by the
supervisory board (Moerland 2000, De Jong et al. 2000). The imposition of voting caps can also
erode voting power in Germany, Belgium or Spain.
7 Furthermore, since the take-over wave in the
1980s, several types of poison pills, like issuing bonds cum warrants or convertible bonds, shelf
registration of equity, are frequently used to dilute the voting power of ‘hostile’ shareholders.
A third factor influencing the relation between ownership and governance is corporate law and its
enforceability in court, which influences the relative costs of holding equity blocks. Corporate
governance systems are embedded in different broad legal traditions: the common law system of
Anglo-American countries and the Commonwealth versus the civil law tradition of Continental
                                                       
4 See e.g. Brennan and Franks (1997) and Goergen and Renneboog (2000a).
5 If the investor owns at least 51% of the voting rights in a subsidiary which owns, in turn, 51% in the target company,
the dominant ultimate investor retains absolute control while he only owns a quarter of the equity (or cash flow rights)
in the target company.
6 In the UK, regulation has discouraged the creation of ownership pyramids. Higher complexity of ownership structures
are encountered in Continental European countries. Germany is characterised by complex shareholdings around and
within industrial groups (Becht and Boehmer, 2000) while the French system is characterised by ownership cascades of
financial groups and cross-company shareholdings (Bloch and Kremp, 2000). In Italy, long pyramids controlled by state
or family-owned corporations are typical (Bianchi et al., 2000). More than a third of listed and non-listed Belgian
companies are controlled by financial holdings companies (Becht et al., 2000). Finally, although state controlled
ownership has decreased substantially in Spain since 1995, state holding companies still own a golden-share in strategic
sectors (Crespi and Garcia, 2000). All the studies referred to in this footnote are forthcoming in Barca and Becht (2000).
7 The board can install voting caps only after prior consent of the annual meeting and the authority can only be
delegated for a limited amount of time. In addition, voting caps are only introduced under specific conditions, e.g. whenUnited we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 4
Europe and its sphere of influence (former colonies). According to La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), the
common law system provides stronger shareholder and creditor protection.
8 However, even within
each governance system, there are differences in corporate control regulation leading to different
cost of control. For instance, Franks et al. (1998) claim that the relative cost of holding large share
blocks is higher in the UK than in the US.
This discussion has shown that the distinction between market oriented and blockholder corporate
governance systems is an oversimplification as corporate law allows for numerous ways to deviate
from the one-share-one-vote rule. In the remainder of this paper, we focus on one particular way of
control accumulation, namely, we investigate whether there is (indirect) evidence of voting rights
coalition formation in the UK. We also investigate whether high relative voting power is used in
active corporate monitoring. Section 2 describes the legal aspects of coalition formation and
formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data sources and describes the data. In section 4,
the methodology is explained, while section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Shareholder voting coalitions and alternative corporate governance mechanisms.
2.1 Relative power of voting pacts.
Since shareholders bear all costs related to their control efforts but only benefit in proportion to their
shareholding, monitoring management may be prohibitively expensive (Grossman and Hart 1980,
1988). Only a large control stake will make monitoring cost-effective such that the costs of corporate
control can be internalised and free riding on control constrained. Little shareholder monitoring is
expected in the UK as most listed industrial UK companies (85%) are widely-held (lacking a
controlling share block of 25% or more). Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that diffuse ownership
persists – in spite of its inherent drawbacks in terms of agency costs – as a result of historic
regulatory evolution (structure- and regulation-driven path dependence). For example, for investors
who are not interested in acquiring a complete company, the mandatory take-over threshold of 30%
is an upper boundary (Goergen and Renneboog 2000a).
9
                                                                                                                                                                                       
the company is threatened by a hostile take over. In each of the 3 German hostile take over attempts since WWII, voting
caps were used (Franks and Mayer, 1998).
8 La Porta et al. (1997) built an index capturing shareholder protection which increases when (i) shareholders are not
required to deposit their shares prior to annual meetings, (ii) shareholders can mail proxy votes, (iii) cumulative voting
is allowed, (iv) minority protection legislation is strong and (v) and small shareholders can call extra-ordinary meetings.
The creditor protection is larger when the rule of absolute priority is followed in case of financial distress.
9 Shareholders transgressing this threshold are required by the Mergers and Monopolies Commission to make a tender
offer for all outstanding shares at a price at least as high as the as highest price that the bidder paid for the target
company’s shares during the 12 months preceding the date when her stake reached 30%. If the offer is accepted within
four months by the shareholder who, as a result, own 90%, the bidder has the right to acquire the remaining 10%.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 5
Agency costs between management and shareholders may be reduced if shareholders increase
control power by forming voting rights coalitions. Usually, shareholders form ‘ad hoc’ voting
coalitions because if such a coalition were to be formed for longer periods of time, regulatory
authorities will consider the coalition as an investor group. In that case, a coalition owning more
than 15% of the shares is required to disclose its ‘strategic intention’ or, if it controls 30% or more
of the votes, the Mergers and Monopolies commission may require the coalition to comply to the
mandatory take-over rule (Stapledon 1996). Thus, voting coalitions are usually temporary and are
customarily forged with a specific aim (e.g. the removal of incumbent management). Moreover,
they are commonly kept confidential, although explicit voting contracts may be drawn up (Van
Hulle 1998). Given the confidential nature of voting pacts, there is little direct evidence of
shareholder coalitions in the UK. Therefore, the existence of shareholder coalitions is tested
indirectly in the context of top management removal. In contrast to most previous corporate control
research where absolute measures of voting power (percentage stakes of equity or Herfindahl
indices) were used, this study captures the relative voting power of each blockholder in potential
voting coalitions
10. All potential pacts are simulated by company and by year and are used to
calculate shareholders’ Shapley values (SV’s) (see section 3), which measure the extend to which
shareholders are pivotal in (potential) voting pacts. The relation between disciplinary actions
against executive directors or CEO and ownership concentration is contrasted with the relation
between disciplining and voting power of shareholder coalitions. If the latter relation is stronger, we
interpret this as indirect evidence of shareholder coalition monitoring. Thus, we hypothesise that:
Shareholders with high relative voting power remove underperforming management (Hypothesis
1a).
This hypothesis assumes that every blockholder has equal propensity to take part in a shareholder
voting pact and to monitor a corporation. However, it is possible that the relative power is better
described as resulting from a voting game consisting of two stages: it may be easier for specific
classes of shareholders to form ex ante coalitions (first stage) before entering in a voting game as a
block (second stage). For example, given that executive directors have similar private benefits of
control, they may combine their shareholdings to form one block and try to obstruct other
shareholders’ actions (e.g. attempts to remove executive directors). Evidence of managerial
entrenchment in the UK is given in Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) and Franks et al. (1998).
Consequently, the executive directors’ equity stakes are first summed and, subsequently, the
relative voting power of this voting block is calculated.
                                                       
10 Interesting studies relating voting power (measured by power indices) and performance are those by Leech (1988,
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From the repeated call for more institutional shareholder activism by the Cadbury (1992),
Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) corporate governance commissions, one might infer that the
level of institutional investor involvement in corporate control in the UK is (too) low. Institutions
may take a passive stance due to lack of monitoring expertise or due to the desire to ensure
investment liquidity since insider trading regulation may immobilise portfolio rebalancing. This
may be the reason why, for instance, occupational pension funds do not add monitoring value
(Faccio and Lasfer 2000). Furthermore, the Newbold Committee of Inquiry (1999) into UK vote
execution by institutions reported that the voting cycle for institutions represents ‘a tortuous
process’ because the proxy forms are held by the custodians and not by the fund managers
(Stapledon and Bates 2000). Still, surveys on voting behaviour of investment funds reveal that vote
casting by institutions has been growing rapidly. Currently, many institutions have established
voting policies (for examples, see Mallin 1999).
11 Investment fund voting has grown swiftly in the
1990s: 20% voted in 1991 (ISC 1991), 35% in 1995 (Mallin 1995) and 41% in 1997 (MVA 1997).
Pension funds exercise voting rights more frequently with 44% in 1993 (ISC 1993) and 59% in
1996 (Mallin 1996). The vast majority of insurance companies votes: 70% exercised voting rights
in 1993 (ISC 1993) and 87% in 1996 (Mallin 1996). The PIRC-survey (1999) on voting trends
concludes that proxy voting levels have increased to over 50%. Such surveys provide some
justification for the calculation of SV’s for accumulated share blocks held by coalitions of bank
managed funds, of investment and pension funds and of funds managed by insurance companies
(see section 5). As different types of institutional investors regularly meet through associations like
e.g. the National Association of Pension Funds, coalition formation among (types of) institutions
may be facilitated.
Similarly, investor categories of non-executive directors, industrial companies, and individuals and
families may each have corresponding monitoring abilities. This may justify the calculation of SV’s
(relative voting power) for each class of owners (after having aggregated all shareholdings by
investor class). The reason why a coalition between shareholders of one particular type may be
easier to forge, results from similarities in private benefits of control within shareholder classes.
Indeed, for the US, Barclay and Holderness (1989) detected that blocks were priced at substantial
premiums of, on average, 20% reflecting the private benefits of control which the investors are
                                                       
11 As a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for potential voting pact formation by institutions, the casting of votes at
annual meetings is considered. Legally, many corporate issues are subject to a shareholder vote: e.g. declaration of the
dividend (after board recommendation), transactions involving the acquisition or disposal of assets worth 25% or more
of the company’s net assets, removal of directors, certain alterations in the capital structure (e.g. share repurchases),
disapplication of the pre-emption rights, directors’ remuneration, etc. For an exhaustive enumeration see Stapledon
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expected to capture subsequently in the form of additional compensation and perquisites.
Furthermore, the premiums differed according to the acquirer’s ownership class. That different
classes of owner have different abilities to extract control rents is also empirically supported for the
US by a.o. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and Sheehan (1988). Firm value does not only
depend upon ownership concentration but also on the specific skills and expertise of blockholders
because poor corporate performance not only results from managerial underperformance but also
from a breakdown in corporate control (Barclays and Holderness 1991)
12. This leads to the
following hypothesis: Shareholders coalitions consisting of - respectively - institutions, industrial
companies and non-executive directors and retaining strong relative voting power, discipline
underperforming management unless executive directors form a strong voting coalition to impede
board restructuring (Hypothesis 1b).
Note that a dual hypothesis is embedded in the above proposal: (i) the nature of concentrated
ownership matters - in terms of monitoring- rather than mere ownership concentration, and (ii)
shareholder coalitions of the same category of owners discipline underperforming management
rather than individual shareholders. For hypothesis 1a, the SV’s are computed as if shareholders
enter the Shapley voting game as individual players: they do not form ex ante-coalitions. In
contrast, the shareholders of hypothesis 1b form coalitions with shareholders belonging to the same
category of owner such that the relative voting power of their corresponding category is computed
as the SV of the accumulated share stakes.
As such, hypotheses 1a and 1b are two extreme cases. Several intermediate cases are possible. For
example, it may be that only the executive directors form coalitions. Also, as there is some evidence
that non-executive directors support incumbent management (Franks et al. 1998, Berger et al.
1999), it is possible that only executive and non-executive directors forge coalitions such that the
SV of all their combined stakes can be computed whereas the other shareholders are participating in
the Shapley game as individuals.
2.2 The market for control
The relative voting power described above does not capture dynamic patterns in control. Still,
Burkart et al. (1997) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998) state that even when tight shareholder
control is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat which reduces managerial
                                                       
12 Banerjee et al (1997) for France and Renneboog (2000) for Belgium show that the private benefits and reasons for
control accumulation by holding companies – which are the largest shareholders in France and Belgium - are manifold:
capturing tax reductions by facilitating intercompany transfers, reducing transaction costs by offering economies of scale
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discretion to undertake (over)investment initiatives. Hence, equity can act as a commitment device to
delegate a certain degree of authority from shareholders to management. Equity control should be
state-contingent: in some states of the world (e.g. with low corporate profitability), close monitoring
resulting from strong ownership concentration is desirable. In other states, close monitoring may
reduce managerial discretion and hence management's effort. Therefore, performance may induce a
partial corporate control market. If poor performance results from underperforming management but
also from insufficient control, low quality monitors may sell their stakes and new (controlling)
shareholders could improve future corporate performance by substituting incumbent management.
Bethel et al. (1998) find empirical support for US companies: activist shareholders purchase large
blocks in diversified companies with poor profitability. Hence, we expect that: Poor corporate
performance gives rise to changes in the ownership structure in companies without sufficiently large
shareholders or with shareholders who take a passive stance concerning monitoring. Hence, changes
in shareholdings are associated with higher managerial turnover in the same year or the year
following the monitors' disciplinary actions (Hypothesis 2).
Voting power is not the only corporate control mechanism and, given interdependence of corporate
governance mechanisms, it is not a priori certain which mechanism dominates (Agrawal and
Knoeber 1996). Therefore, it is important to include alternative governance mechanisms like board
structure- and capital structure- related variables to the voting power models.
2.3 Internal corporate governance systems.
Part of the fiduciary duty of non-executive directors is monitoring corporate and managerial
performance. A well functioning board reduces transaction or agency costs associated with
separation of ownership and control. Non-executive directors have incentives to develop reputations
as experts in decision control because the value of their human capital depends on their
performance as monitors in other organisations (Fama and Jensen 1983). Consequently, directors
are subjected to the disciplining of passive leadership by the external labour market. For the U.S.,
Kaplan and Reishus (1990) report that managers of poorly performing companies are likely to lose
directorships in their own companies and will rarely be offered new directorships. Directors who
left the boards of distressed U.S. companies, of firms that filed for bankruptcy or restructured their
debt, held approximately one-third fewer directorships three years after their departure (Gilson
1990). Brickley et al. (1999) find that both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own
board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other
boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Separating the role of
CEO and of non-executive chairman is supposed to strengthen the board’s monitoring ability as aUnited we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 9
non-executive chairman could ensure more independence from management.
13 Consequently, we
expect that a greater proportion of non-executive directors implies lower board domination by
management due to higher monitoring ability by non-executive directors. This is reflected by
increased executive director turnover when performance is poor. Separating the functions of CEO
and chairman facilitates disciplining of underperforming management: such dual control should lead
to higher turnover (Hypothesis 3).
 2.4  Capital structure as a pre-commitment device.
The probability of defaulting on debt covenants rises with high debt/equity ratios. Hence, creditor
intervention may be expected with falling levels of profitability. The choice of gearing can therefore
be considered as a precommitment mechanism for management (e.g. in Aghion and Bolton, 1992;
Berkovitch et al., 1997) such that high executive director turnover is positively related to high
gearing. The relative power of creditors increases when there is corporate underperformance and a
need to refinance the company. Empirical evidence for the US is provided by Dennis and Dennis
(1993) who infer creditor monitoring from the fact that high leverage (combined with high managerial
ownership) improves shareholder returns. Therefore, we expect that management of poorly
performing companies with high leverage and poor liquidity experience increased turnover
(Hypothesis 4).
3. Data sources and variable description.
3.1 Sample description
A sample of 250 companies was randomly selected from all the companies quoted on the London
Stock Exchange in 1988 excluding financial institutions, real estate companies and insurance
companies. We collected data on voting rights (ownership), performance, capital structure and
board structure over the period 1988 to 1993. Only those companies for which at least three years of
ownership data were available, were retained in the sample in order to allow an dynamic analysis
via panel data. As a result, companies delisted through take-overs or insolvencies between 1988
through to 1990 were therefore excluded, but those that were delisted subsequent to 1990 were
included in the analysis. In addition, seven of the remaining 250 companies were dropped through
lack of performance data. Subsequent to 1990, 29 of the sample companies were acquired and 5
were liquidated or entered a formal bankruptcy process.
                                                       
13 Such recommendations have been formulated in the U.S. Bacon report (1993), the U.K. Cadbury Committee report
(1992), the French Viénot report (1995), the Dutch Peeters Commission report (1997), the Belgian corporate governance
guidelines by the Stock Exchange Commission, the Association of Employers and the Commission for Banking and
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3.2 Ownership and control data.
Ownership data on the size of shareholdings both for existing and new shareholders for each year in
the period 1988-1993 were collected. All directors’ holdings greater than 0.1% are included as well
as outside shareholders’ stakes of 5% and more (until 1989) and of 3% and above (from 1990 when
the statutory disclosure threshold was reduced to 3%). Non-beneficial share stakes held by directors
on behalf of their families or charitable trusts were added to the directors’ beneficial holdings.
Although directors do not obtain cash flow benefits from these non-beneficial stakes, they usually
have control rights. Shareholdings were classified into 9 categories: bank managed funds, funds
managed by insurance companies, investment/pension funds, industrial and commercial companies,
families and individuals (not directly related to any director), government stakes, real estate
companies, executive directors (and their immediate family and trusts), and non-executive directors
(and their immediate family and trusts). Directors and their families as hence called ‘insiders’
whereas other major shareholders are labelled ‘outsiders’.
14 The identity of the owner of substantial
shareholdings labelled as ‘nominees’ was collected from the company secretaries who were
contacted by fax. In almost all cases, the shareholder behind the nominee company is an
institutional investor. Attempts to collect data on shareholder attendance and vote casting for a
subsample of companies failed as these companies were not willing to disclose such data.
3.3 Performance measures and capital structure.
In order to investigate the relation between substitute forms of corporate governance and
performance, several performance measures were collected for the period 1986-1995: abnormal
share price returns, dividends per share, after tax cash flow margins (cash flows divided by total
sales), operational return (before interest and taxes) on assets, after tax rates of return on book
equity, and changes in earnings after tax and interest (standardised by total assets). Abnormal share
price returns were calculated from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) and include a beta-
correction for thin trading. Accounting returns were collected from Datastream. Data on capital
structure (gearing, measured as the book value of debt/total assets) and liquidity (interest coverage,
measured as EBIT/interest payments) are from Datastream. A second leverage measure includes
market data from the LSPD: debt/(debt + market capitalisation). Corporate refinancing in the form
of new equity issues are collected from the LSPD.
                                                       
14 The pattern of ownership is not significantly affected by recent IPOs (where insider ownership is particularly high)
because the large majority of our companies, 71%, have been listed for at least eight years.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 11
3.4 Board of Directors.
In order to determine the number of directors who had borne board responsibility over the fiscal
years, as well the number of directors joining and leaving the board, the notes of the annual reports
over the period 1988-93 were consulted. About all directors the following information was
collected: name, status (executive versus non-executive, chairman, CEO), age and tenure (for CEO
and chairman only). The reasons for directors leaving the board were collected from annual reports
as well as from the Financial Times and Nexus databases. This way, a distinction was made
between conflictual and natural turnover, the latter being defined – in line with Weisbach (1988) -
as turnover due to illness, death, and retirement at the age of 63 or above. Due to lack of
informative reasons and the use of euphemistic terms explaining director turnover, all non-natural
turnover is considered to be conflictual. For companies entering bankruptcy procedures or taken
over, board turnover is included only up to the year prior to the event.
4. Methodology
4.1  Shareholder control measurement.
The one-share-one-vote principle is upheld in listed UK companies as there are no dual class voting
shares and as regulation has impeded cascade ownership structures. Still, the percentage of
ownership does not necessarily reflect the degree of control as 50% of equity plus 1 vote yields
absolute control. Given that most UK companies are characterised by diffuse ownership structures,
measures need to be used which capture the true degree of shareholder control. To some extent, the
Herfindahl index captures the dispersion of ownership across shareholders. For example, if there are
three shareholders with 40%, 40% and 20%, the total percentage of voting rights of the largest three
shareholders amounts 1.00 whereas the Herfindahl of the 3 largest shareholdings sums the squared
percentages to 0.36. Still, the Herfindahl does not reflect the degree of control which individual
shareholders (on a stand-alone basis or in a coalition) can exert. Therefore, we resort to Shapley
values (SV’s) which assign a power index to each shareholder reflecting his relative importance in
forming winning voting coalitions. In the example given above, each shareholder’s SV is 0.33
because each is pivotal in coalitions yielding more than 50% of the control rights.
Within a framework of co-operative games - with transferable utility - in characteristic functional
form, Shapley (1953) developed ‘Shapley value assignment’ f defined as follows:
fa(w) = def 
!
1
n { }) ( ( )! ( )! 1 ( a X X X n X
N X￿
˝
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and game w is a real-valued function whose domain is the power set (the set of subsets) of N (a non-
empty finite set) such that wf=0. Any member of N (the grand coalition of w), a, is a player of w. If
X is a coalition, the real number wX is called the worth of X in w.
Shapley and Shubik (1954) introduced the concept of P-power which posits an office-seeking
motivation of voting behaviour and which is reflected in the Shapley values (or Shapley-Shubik
values). If the coalition wins, it gains collective possession of a fixed amount of transferable utility
and each of the winning votes receive a non-negative payoff, all adding up to the total prize. The
remaining voters get zero as a pay off (Felsenthal and Machover 1998). In the context of this study,
the winning coalition disciplines the incumbent management. As differential voting behaviour is
motivated by different conceptions of future performance and private benefits under the incumbent
management, the resisting shareholders (among which the equity owning incumbent management)
are expected will suffer a reduction in financial returns and private benefits.
15
A problem in calculating the relative voting power is the fact that the owners of a substantial
proportion of the equity capital (on average about 56%) are unknown. These shareholders – hence
called atomistic shareholders - are not directors and do not comply to the disclosure regulation
because their share stakes do not exceed the notification threshold of 3%. Although assumptions on
potential coalition formation and voting behaviour could be quantified for this ‘ocean’ of atomistic
shareholders, we assume that they do not participate in voting coalitions as it is in practice difficult
to organise minuscule share stakes into voting blocks (Chung and Kim 1999). During protracted
hostile take-over battles, coalitions of large shareholders may solicit votes of atomistic shareholders
to buttress the coalition, but management removal seems to be more the competence of large
shareholders due to free riding behaviour of small shareholders. Therefore, prior to calculating the
SV’s, rescaling the sum of the large share blocks (the director’s stakes and the share stakes
exceeding the 3% threshold) to 100% is a fair assumption. The resulting SV’s reflect the relative
voting power whereby a winning coalition is expected to reach absolute control (50%+1 of the
rescaled vote).
16
                                                       
15 Felsenthal and Machover (1998) also discuss several alternative power indices like the Deegan-Packel index and the
Johnston index but illustrate the ”extremely counter-intuitive ‘pathological’ behaviour of these indices” (p.211).
16 There are a few cases where a shareholder who owns only a little share stake is given a disproportionally large
relative voting power. For example, when the sole large shareholder holds 3% of the shares, he received a SV of 1. In
order to avoid this potential problem, we have excluded companies with only one shareholder with an ownership stakeUnited we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 13
4.2  Methodology
Panel data regressions for the period 1988-93 are performed with executive director turnover as
dependent variable and, as independent variables, power indices by category of owner as well as power
indices interacting with lagged performance. Alternative corporate control variables capturing capital
structure, financial distress, board composition and changes in ownership are also included as lagged
variables in each model. The parameter coefficient of the interaction terms indicates whether corporate
governance actions are triggered by (lagged) poor performance. Industry dummies are also included.
When the dependent variable is executive board turnover, Tobit models (with and without logistic
transformations of the dependent variable) are used to adjust for the truncation of the dependent
variable. When the dependent variable is CEO turnover (a dummy variable equalling one in case of
conflictual CEO replacement), a logit model is utilised. The basic framework is structured as
follows: turnover (exec. directors or CEO) depends upon
a. performance (performance at t, t-1 and t-2; whereby performance is measured by annual
abnormal returns, operational ROA, earnings losses, ROE, cash flow margin and dividend
changes),
b. relative voting power (SV’s at t or t-1 and interaction between SV’s at t and performance at t-1;
whereby various assumptions are made about the likelihood that specific classes of shareholders
vote: see section 2),
c. changes in voting power (increases in ownership concentration by class of shareholder),
d. leverage and refinancing (leverage at t-1, interaction of leverage with performance at t-1,
interest coverage at t-1 and interaction of interest coverage with performance at t-1, new equity
issues at t; whereby leverage is measured as the ratio of debt on (debt + market capitalisation),
interest coverage as EBIT/interest payments and new equity issues as a dummy variable),
e. board structure (proportion of non-executive directors at t-1 and interaction with performance at
t-1, separation of CEO and chairman at t and interaction with performance at t-1) and
f. disclosure dummy and controls (change in disclosure threshold (dummy) and industry
variables).
The control variables are taken at t-1 in order to take care of endogeneity problems. To check the
robustness of results, fixed effects models were estimated as were models including industry
dummies.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
less than 5% and companies with 2 shareholders each owning less then 5%. This resulted in removing 3% of the
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5. Description of Ownership in the UK and coalition formation.
5.1  Share stake concentration and the nature of ownership.
Panel A of table 1 shows the that the largest shareholder’s equity stake over the period 1989-93 is
between 14 and 19% with an average of 16.6%. A coalition of the three largest shareholders own
30.1% in the average listed company and the combined equity stake of all large shareholders
(owning 3% of more) amounts to 39.1%. Panel B shows the relative importance of the different
classes of shareholders in terms of ownership for the year 1992. Institutions, and in particular
insurance companies, are the most important shareholder category owning 24.4% of the total equity
(averaged over the companies with an institutional investor as owner), while the combined board of
directors controls 17.3% of voting rights. The combined shareholdings of families and individuals
amount to 16.3% while industrial and commercial companies control 14.3% of the voting rights.
Insert about here Tables 1 and 2
The number of investors owning at least 3% in the average sample company is about 6 (Table 2,
panel A). This average has increased from 3.8 in 1988  to 6.4 in 1992 because of the change in
transparency regulation which decreased the mandatory disclosure threshold from 5% to 3%.
17
Panel B reveals that most institutional shareholdings are small (below 10%). Larger stakes are rare
with an average of respectively 0.29 shareholders per company. The most important category of
shareholder controlling stakes of 10% or more are directors with 60 stakes (38 of which are held by
executives). In 19% of sample companies industrial and commercial companies hold 34 large
blocks of 10% or more.
The SV’s presented in table 1 represent the relative voting power of a shareholder in potential
voting coalitions. In this computation, it is assumed that all large investors (owning 3% and more)
and all directors participate in voting coalitions with each other (regardless of class of owner) and
that shareholders without disclosed shareholdings are atomistic and do not add their voting rights to
a coalition. The SV’s of the individual shareholders are subsequently summed by class of owner.
The dispersed nature of the shareholding structure is reflected in panel A of table 1: the largest
shareholder with an ownership stake of about 15% has a relatively high SV of at least 0.50. If the
largest three shareholders form a coalition, their relative voting power increases to over 0.75. This
means that such a coalition would has a de facto supermajority yielding substantial power and
                                                       
17 After 1991, the average number of shareholders decreases to 5.5. As mentioned in section 3.1, we study the impact of
relative voting power in relation to performance and managerial disciplining. Hence, in order to capture the dynamics of
voting power, at least 3 years of data were required for each sample company in the period 1988-1991. This implies that
the companies that were taken over or went bankrupt were excluded from the sample. In the years 1992 and 1993, more
than 30 companies, with a size smaller than the median, disappear from our sample following receivership or take-
overs. Thus, the decrease in average number of shareholders is the result of this size effect.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 15
enabling it to even change the articles of incorporation (see Stapledon 1996). Still the SV’s of panel
A may be misleading as they assume that every large shareholder has a similar interest in
accumulating voting power, a similar propensity to participate in voting coalitions and similar
control abilities. The empirical evidence that specific classes of shareholders are better monitors
than others (see section 2) motivates the inclusion of SV’s calculated by class of owner in the
disciplining models. Panel B of table 1 shows the relative voting power by shareholder class. The
SV of the largest shareholder by class of owner shows that insurance companies hold a SV of 0.26
in the average company, industrial companies have an average SV of 0.34, and executive and non-
executive directors respectively hold a relatively power of 0.21 and 0.16.
18
5.2 The market for share stakes.
Table 3 exhibits that the market in share stakes is not unimportant: it shows the number of increases
and decreases in large shareholdings by degree of ownership concentration and also distinguishes
among new shareholders (those who transgress the disclosure threshold of 3% for the first time) and
‘old’ shareholders who increase their existing stake. The table reveals that the number of sales of
share stakes is more or less balanced by the number of purchases
19, which confirms the fact that,
once a block of shares is assembled, the position is unlikely to be dissipated (Shleifer and Vishny
1986). It is in the large shareholder's interest to wait until someone who values control, expresses
interest in this block because if the block is broken up and sold on the open market, part of the firm's
value arising from the possibility of value-increasing monitoring is lost. A shareholding increase of
more than 5% took place in 60% of the sample companies, while in 16.5% of the sample substantial
shareholding increases and new share stakes occurred.
Insert about here Tables 3 and 4.
5.3  Performance, capital structure and corporate size.
Table 4 reports summary statistics of the performance data for the year 1992. As expected for a
random sample, the average annual abnormal return is close to zero, while this average company
has an ROE of 11.8%, a cash flow margin (cash flow/sales) of 6.2 and a profit margin of 2.9. This
firm’s capital gearing amounts to 37% and its interest coverage is more than 9 times (with a median
of about 4). Eleven per cent of companies issued new equity using rights issues (146 rights issues
are recorded over the period 1988-93). The working capital ratio (short term assets/ short term
liabilities) is 1.42 for the average company.
                                                       
18 The numbers mentioned in the text refer to the left hand side columns of panel B where the average SV is taken over
all companies with stakes of a specific shareholder class represented in the company. The numbers in the right handUnited we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 16
5.4 Board composition and top management turnover.
Over the period 1989-93, the average number of directors amounts to 9.5 with a median of 9 (table
5). Over time, there is a gradual increase in the average number of directors from 9.2 in 1988 to
10.1 in 1993. Sixty-one per cent of directors held executive positions in the company and in about
two thirds of companies the positions of CEO and chairman were held by separate directors. The
CEOs and chairman’s average age was 53 and 59 years, respectively, with tenures of 5 and 6 years.
Total turnover amounts to 7.4% yearly, with a higher proportion of executive directors leaving the
board (8.7%) than of non-executives (4.7%). The annual turnover of CEOs amounted to 11.4%
while there was a 7.8% turnover of the chairmen. These turnover data are corrected for natural
turnover due to age related retirements (at 63 or above), illness or death. There is a strong relation
between executive and CEO board turnover and performance. In loss making companies, average
annual executive director and CEO turnover amount respectively to 15% and 26%, more than two
and three times (respectively) the turnover in profitable companies. A similar degree of
differentiation in turnover is found for companies with and without substantial dividend reductions.
Companies with the lowest abnormal returns (below –25%) experience an average annual executive
turnover of about 15% and CEO turnover of about 20% whereas the turnover in the other quintiles
is only about half this number. Franks et al. (1998) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) confirm the non-
linearity in the performance-turnover relation for the UK as do Morck et al. (1988) for the US. Non-
executive director turnover is not statistically different between subsamples of poorly and well
performing companies.
Insert here table 5.
6. Results.
In this section, Tobit regression results of the relation between relative voting power and alternative
governance mechanisms, and executive board turnover are presented. The robustness of these
results is verified by alternative performance measures and fixed effects models, discussed in the
text. As an alternative dependent variable, CEO turnover was used in logit models, the results of
which are also discussed in the text.
6.1 Monitoring by individual shareholders or by coalitions.
Table 6 shows that (non-natural) turnover of the executive board is strongly dependent upon
performance: negative abnormal returns and accounting returns, and dividend decreases lead to
                                                                                                                                                                                       
side columns are necessarily smaller because the total number of sample companies is taken (which includes companies
in which there is no shareholder of a specific shareholder class present).
19 Table A3 in the appendix shows the changes in shareholders by class of investor and by size.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 17
significant increases in turnover in the current or two subsequent years.
20 A company in the lowest
decile of abnormal performance (–50% or lower) during three consecutive years, will experience
7% more annual turnover compared to average performing companies. A dividend decrease in the
year of turnover and one year prior, gives 8% more annual executive turnover than companies
without decreases
21 and loss making companies have 17% more annual turnover than firms
generating profits. For both the US (e.g. Weisbach 1988) and the UK (e.g. Lai et al. 1997 and
Franks et al. 1999), there is evidence that the negative relation between performance and turnover is
non-linear with high turnover being concentrated in the worst performing companies. No support is
found for hypothesis 1a: there is no (positive) relation between ownership concentration, measured
by the largest and 2
nd largest shareholdings (table 6) or total ownership concentration (not shown),
and managerial disciplining. Substituting relative voting power for ownership concentration, only
yields a statistically insignificant negative correlation with turnover. This negative relation may
result from the fact that some of these largest share stakes are held by directors which may oppose
board restructuring. Hence, mere ownership concentration does not matter, but the nature of
concentrated ownership may influence director substitution. Fixed effects models confirm the
rejection of hypothesis 1a. Model re-estimation with CEO turnover as dependent variable confirms
the negative correlation with performance and the lack of significant correlation with ownership
concentration.
Insert here table 6.
To test hypothesis 1b, the monitoring merits of block holdings by nature of ownership are
investigated. A distinction is made among seven classes of owner: (i-iii) institutions, consisting of
bank managed funds, of investment and pension funds and of insurance companies, (iv) industrial
and commercial companies, (v) individuals and families (not related to a director) and (vi-vii)
executive and non-executive directors. Other classes of owner, like governmental institutions or real
estate companies, are not included as they only own a limited number of shareholdings (which are
small).
In order to investigate whether large individual shareholders or coalitions of substantial
shareholders discipline underperforming management, three different ownership models are
investigated in table 7. Firstly, the largest equity stake by category of owner is included in the
model as it may be that the shareholding of largest shareholder suffices for monitoring
                                                       
20 Other tested performance variables like cash flow measures, ROA, earnings losses (dummy) all yield a high
correlation with turnover.
21 These increases are net of additional turnover due to monitoring actions by large shareholders, creditor and corporate
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underperforming management. Secondly, the relative voting power of the largest shareholder
(measured by the SV or the degree to which the largest shareholder by category is pivotal in the
potential coalitions) is tested and henceforth called SVlargest/cat
i. Thirdly, according to hypothesis 1b,
coalition formation among shareholders of the same ownership class is facilitated by similarities in
private benefits of control or by the existence of a forum for regular meetings. Consequently, SV’s
of the sum of all shareholdings by category of owner are calculated (henceforth called SVcategory
i),
reflecting the relative voting power of this class of shareholders. Hypothesis 1b predicts increased
monitoring by coalitions of outsiders and increased resistance to board restructuring by
management coalitions.
The following example shows how the SVcategory
i‘s are computed. Suppose a company has 5
shareholders: company 1 (owning 16% of the voting rights), company 2 (owning 8%), insurance
company 1 (owning 6%), insurance company 2 (owning 6%) and a family which is not related to a
director (owning 14%). In total, these large shareholders control 50% of the company. We assume
that the ocean of atomistic shareholders (who are not directors) is not involved in toppling
incumbent management. Therefore, the equity stakes of the large shareholders and of directors are
rescaled which, in this example, doubles their interest in the company. Calculating the SV’s of the
individual shareholders gives 0.30 and 0.13 for companies 1 and 2, 0.13 for each institution and
0.30 for the family. The ranked SV’s of individual shareholders (independent of their category of
owner) were input in the model of table 6. The SVlargest/cat
i of table 7 are 0.30 for the class of
industrial companies, 0.13 for insurance companies and 0.30 for the category of individuals and
families. With regard to the SVcategory
i, all the share stakes by category are first added and
subsequently the SV of the combined shareholders by category is calculated. In this example, the
categories of industrial companies, insurance companies and families own rescaled ownership
stakes of, respectively, 48%, 24% and 28%. The SVcategory
i’s happen to be equal for each of the
categories to 0.33.
Table 7 reveals that executive director removal significantly decreases when executive directors can
form a strong voting coalition. Franks et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) also report that
substantial managerial ownership leads to entrenchment effect: management is able to ward off
successfully any attempts to replace them, even in the wake of poor performance. Whereas the
ownership percentage held by the largest executive director is statistically significant in 3
performance models, the executive relative voting power (SVlargest/cat
i) yields stronger results (5
performance models within the 1% level of significance and 1 within the 5% level). The SV’s of the
executive directors’ combined stakes (SVcategory
i) are more negatively correlated with managerialUnited we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 19
disciplining. Consequently, this (indirectly) supports the hypothesis that executive directors form
voting coalitions to impede board changes.
Whereas the percentage of equity held by the largest non-executive director is not related to
executive board turnover, the relative voting power of the group of non-executive directors leads to
less managerial disciplining. Hence, it seems that a coalition of non-executives uses its relative
voting power to resist managerial disciplining and presumably votes along with management. This
may be because poor corporate performance not only results from managerial underperformance but
also from a breakdown of corporate governance by non-executive directors and thus makes non-
executives also culpable for weak corporate performance. In order to comprehend the unexpected
finding that non-executive directors seem to support incumbent management, it should be pointed
out that this analysis focuses on the ‘pre-Cadbury’ period. In 1993, the London Stock Exchange
required all listed companies to implement the recommendations for good corporate governance of
the Cadbury commission, in which the independence and monitoring role of non-executive directors
was strengthened. It should be noted that the non-executives’ SVcategory
i measure (the relative voting
power of non-executive directors as a group) has a higher correlation with executive board turnover
than the SVlargest/cat
i measure (which captures the relative voting power of non-executive directors as
individuals). This provides (indirect) evidence that non-executive directors form coalitions to ward
off board changes.
The presence of investment/pension funds and banks with high relative voting power does not seem
to have any impact on managerial substitution which validates the call for more institutional
shareholder activism. However, the percentage ownership of insurance companies is positively
correlated to (non-natural) executive board turnover in all performance models. The fact that it is
insurance companies rather than investment and pension fund managers or fund managing banks,
exert their voting rights is not surprising as insurance companies often hold larger share stakes in a
single company and as the surveys on the exercise of voting rights (discussed in section 2) revealed
that insurance companies are used to cast voting rights more frequently than other institutions. As
before, the fact that the SVcategory
i measure is statistically more significant than the SVlargest/cat
i
measure implies that insurance companies seem to collaborate to remove executive directors.
Finally, industrial and commercial companies with high relative voting power seem to remove
management in badly performing companies. Still, there is no evidence that it is coalitions of
industrial companies rather than individual companies with high relative voting power which
remove management because the significance of the SVcategory
i is lower than the SVlargest/cat
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reason is that in many companies a coalition among several corporate shareholder is not possible as
there is often only one corporation owning a large equity stake. The voting power of individuals’ or
families’ is not related to managerial disciplining.
Insert here table 7.
The robustness of the findings with the SVcategory
i-measures was verified by estimating the models
including,  respectively, the cumulative percentage of equity by category of owner and the sum of
the Shapley values of individual shareholders by category of owner
22. These models showed
significant results for the same categories of owner as in the models with SVcategory
i-measures, but at
lower levels of statistical significance. This confirms that executive and non-executive directors and
insurance companies seem to forge voting coalitions.
A re-estimation the Tobit models controlling for fixed effects shows that the findings of table 7 are
upheld. Repeating previous analyses for CEO disciplining (non-natural CEO turnover) generally
yields weaker results. There is little monitoring evidence for insurance companies and industrial
companies, but substantial executive ownership protects the CEO of an underperforming company
against a forced resignation.
From the above analysis, we conclude that there is a strong relation between executive turnover and
voting power. The influence of ownership can be summarised as follows: there is evidence of
shareholder coalition formation by outside shareholders (mainly for insurance companies, but less
so for industrial companies) to discipline management and by executive and non-executive directors
to resist board restructuring. Table 7 has shown that the use of  relative voting power measures are
an important improvement to the use of percentages of ownership.
23
6.2 Alternative corporate governance mechanisms.
Hypotheses 2-4 state that monitoring can be expected from the internal control mechanism (the non-
executive board), the market in share stakes and creditors. Including all monitoring mechanisms
into one model allows for testing which disciplinary device dominates. Moreover, including
interaction terms of all governance mechanisms with performance can give an answer to the
question whether or not disciplining takes place in the wake of poor performance.
                                                       
22 The SV calculated via this method amount for the categories of industrial companies, of insurance companies and of
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Table 8, which includes the SVcategory
i (shown in table 7 to give the strongest correlation with
managerial disciplining), exhibits that the findings supporting hypothesis 1b are confirmed.
Executive board changes are induced by poor share price and accounting performance, measured by
abnormal returns, operational return on assets, earnings losses, return (after interest and tax) on
equity, cash flow margin and dividend changes.
24 Executive directors seem to be able to defend
their positions by impeding board restructuring irrespective of corporate performance as no relation
between turnover and the relative power of executive directors interacting with performance was
uncovered. Similarly, there is some (weak) evidence that non-executive directors resist the removal
of executive directors even in the wake of poor performance. In contrast, industrial and commercial
companies with high relative voting power seem to discipline executive directors. That this happens
when performance is poor, is reflected in significant negative interaction terms with lagged
performance. As shown in table 7, it is the voting power of (potential) coalitions of insurance
companies rather than that of individual companies which is related to executive turnover. Table 8
confirms this finding but does not show that executive director substitution by insurance companies
is related to underperformance as the interactive terms vary in sign. It may well be that insurance
companies are instrumental in supporting management teams with strategic alternatives whereas
removing management teams when the company is subject to (extreme) poor performance is left to
other agents.
The Shapley values by category of owner (SVcategory
i) capture the distribution of voting rights but
not the trading in blocks of share stakes. For example, tt may be that the a shareholder with low
monitoring ability sells out to a shareholder with a managerial alternative. If the new shareholder is
of the same category of owner, the SV will ceteris paribus not reflect any change. Therefore, gross
increases in voting rights for each category of owner are included in the model of table 8.
25 There is
strong evidence that changes in ownership structure lead to increased board turnover. With the
exception of increases in equity stakes by institutions, ownership increases by the classes of
corporations, individuals and families, executive and non-executives are positively related to
increased board turnover. Whereas the new or larger share stakes held by companies and
individuals and families precede the executive removal, the changes in executive and non-executive
shareholdings coincide or follow executive board changes as these are owned to new directors
                                                                                                                                                                                       
23 Running OLS-regressions controlled for fixed effects rather than Tobit models, the adjusted R
2 is 7-9% if the equity
percentage of the largest owner is included. This adjusted R
2 increases by about 2% for models with the relative voting
power SVlargest/cat
i and increases by another 2-3% to a range of 11-16% when including SVcategory
i.
24 The performance variable at t-1 in table 8 is not significant in contrast to this variable in table 7. This results from the
fact that performance at t-1 in table 8 is included in the interactive terms.
25 In 1989, the ownership disclosure threshold was reduced from 5% to 3%, which is reflected in annual reports of 1990.
As the data used for table 8 reflect all changes, the data as of 1990 are more refined, a disclosure dummy variable was
included. The results do not change if the pooled regression was run with only data subsequent to the disclosure change.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 22
promoted to the board. This explains the positive correlation between directors’ increases in
shareholdings and board turnover. The interactive terms test whether these increases are triggered
by performance. Table 8 also reveals that the changes in shareholdings do not seem to constitute a
market for (partial) control (hypothesis 2) because there is no evidence that increases in voting
rights are related to increased monitoring (with the exception of increases in stakes controlled by
corporations).
Hypothesis 3 states that an independent non-executive board will acquit themselves better of their
governance tasks. Two measures are used as proxies for non-executive directors’ independence
from management: the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and duality of the
functions of CEO and chairman.
26 The degree of independence (and hence monitoring) is expected
to rise when the non-executive directors are not outnumbered by executive directors and when the
CEO does not chair the board. Table 8 shows that there is little consistent evidence to support
hypothesis 3. In four performance models, a large number of non-executive directors is negatively
correlated to executive turnover. This counter-intuitive finding is in line with earlier (weak)
evidence that non-executives seem to support incumbent management, but is attenuated by the
negative interaction terms (in two performance models) indicating that when performance is poor, a
high number of non-executives leads to more executive removal. Separating the functions of CEO
and chairman is not related to more corporate governance actions.
A high debt-ratio may be a pre-commitment device for management to generate a steady stream of
cash flows. If the debt-ratio increases due to poor performance and equity erosion, increased
creditor monitoring is expected. Table 8 exhibits that high gearing is significantly positively related
to executive board turnover. The negative interaction terms show that when high gearing coincides
with low abnormal returns, increased managerial disciplining is taking place. Low liquidity (in
combination with poor performance) does not seem to be a reason to remove management.
27
Refinancing, measured by new equity issues, precedes managerial disciplining because a need to
recapitalize the company is the prime occasion for existing shareholders (via rights issues) or new
shareholders to remove the executive directors.
28 The interactive term shows that poor performance
combined with corporate refinancing leads to high executive turnover.
                                                       
26 Note that the period analyzed is prior to the Cadbury recommendations. Therefore, few corporate governance
variables (like the presence of audit, remuneration and nomination committees, the number of outside directorship etc )
were consistently reported in this period and could not be included in the model.
27 The correlation between liquidity (interest coverage) and capital gearing is low and does not lead to multicollinearity.
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Re-estimating the model with fixed effects supports the conclusions described above. The findings
for the CEO turnover model are weaker: there is evidence of managerial entrenchment, (weak) non-
executive support for the incumbent CEO and (weak) disciplining by corporations. Furthermore,
poor performance combined with a critical financial situation (i.e. refinancing need) and separating
the functions of CEO and chairman enhances the probability of CEO removal. For a small sample
of companies, data on CEO tenure were available. For this subsample, long tenure reduces the
probability of CEO removal as potential past successes in longer track records may compensate
current underperformance.
Insert here table 8.
7. Conclusion.
This paper has investigated whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to
discipline incumbent management. Shapley values capturing the relative power of shareholder
coalitions by category of owner, outperform models with percentage ownership stakes and models
measuring the relative voting power of individual owners. There is evidence of successful executive
director resistance to board restructuring if these executive directors can combine their ownership
stakes to a substantial block of voting power. Non-executive directors seem to support incumbent
management, but poor performance is penalised by industrial and commercial companies with large
relative voting power. The voting power of insurance companies is positively related to executive
director turnover, but this voting power is used for remove management for reasons of other than
performance, which may be of strategic nature. Investment/pension funds and funds managed by
banks do not play a role in the management substitution process.
A large number of share blocks change hands, and new shareholders – industrial companies,
individuals and families– are related to increased executive director turnover. Still, these changes in
share stakes do not constitute a market in (partial) control since there is no systematic evidence that
these changes are triggered by poor performance with the notable exception of industrial
companies. There is little evidence that adjusting the board composition to allow for more
independence for non-executive directors leads to higher managerial removal. In contrast, high
gearing facilitates substitution of executive directors, especially if the company needs to be
refinanced.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
28 Refinancing takes place in the same year as executive director turnover. However, this does not induce a causality
problem because in almost all cases, the equity issue took place prior to management turnover.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 24
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Table 1 : Concentration and distribution of ownership and voting power.
This table shows the ownership concentration and distribution of the largest shareholders by category of owner over the sample period.
Source: own calculations.
Panel A : Ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders for 1988-93.
Largest shareholder 3 largest owners 5 largest owners all shareholders
Year Sample %ownership Shapley %ownership Shapley %ownership Shapley %ownership Shapley Herfindahl
1988 193 18.9% 0.68 33.0% 0.92 36.5% 0.98 37.6% 1.00 0.46
1989 206 18.2% 0.68 31.6% 0.92 35.4% 0.98 36.4% 1.00 0.45
1990 232 17.3% 0.55 31.2% 0.80 37.7% 0.92 42.4% 1.00 0.32
1991 233 16.1% 0.50 30.3% 0.76 37.5% 0.90 43.6% 1.00 0.29
1992 204 15.3% 0.50 28.8% 0.77 35.6% 0.90 41.1% 1.00 0.29
1993 152 13.9% 0.56 25.5% 0.83 30.5% 0.94 33.7% 1.00 0.34
Panel B : Ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders by shareholder category for 1992.
Average based on total number of co’s with a
shareholding for this category of owner
Average based on total number of sample companies
Numb. of co's All sample
1992 with large owners % equity Shapley Herfindahl companies % equity Shapley Herfindahl
1 Banks Largest 62 5.7% 0.16 204 1.7% 0.05
Sum 62 6.2% 0.18 0.04 1.9% 0.05 0.01
2 Investment and Largest 139 6.0% 0.20 204 4.1% 0.14
Pension funds Sum 139 8.9% 0.27 0.08 6.1% 0.18 0.06
3 Insurance co’s Largest 173 8.4% 0.26 204 7.2% 0.22
Sum 173 17.1% 0.46 0.11 14.5% 0.39 0.09
Total Largest 187 8.4% 0.32 204 7.2% 0.29
Institutions Sum 187 24.4% 0.68 0.18 22.4% 0.62 0.16
4 Industrial cos Largest 86 12.8% 0.34 204 5.4% 0.14
Sum 86 14.3% 0.36 0.13 6.0% 0.15 0.06
5 Families and Largest 31 10.7% 0.19 204 1.6% 0.03
individuals Sum 31 16.4% 0.27 0.07 2.5% 0.04 0.01
6 Government Largest 6 5.7% 0.03 204 0.2% 0.00
Sum 6 5.7% 0.03 0.04 0.2% 0.00 0.00
7 Executive Largest 103 8.1% 0.16 204 4.1% 0.08
directors Sum 103 11.6% 0.21 0.07 5.9% 0.11 0.04
8 Non-executive Largest 58 10.3% 0.21 204 2.9% 0.06
directors Sum 58 14.5% 0.26 0.08 4.1% 0.07 0.02
Total directors Largest 118 10.3% 0.21 204 4.1% 0.12
Sum 118 17.3% 0.31 0.10 10.0% 0.18 0.06United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 28
Table 2 : Relative importance of shareholders by class of owner and by size of equity stake.
This table shows the average number of large shareholders over the period 1988-1993. Mean (tot.) and Mean (cat.) stand for the average stake by class of
shareholder whereby the denominator is, respectively, the total number of companies and the total number of companies with a shareholder of this category.
# of invest. stands for the number of investors in this category. Source: Own calculations with data of annual reports.
Panel A: Number of shareholder by sample company.
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Average number of shareholders per co. 3.77 3.92 6.08 6.62 6.44 5.45
Total number of investors in all sample co’s 840 879 1429 1549 1327 839
Number of sample co’s 223 224 235 234 206 154
Panel B : Average number of large shareholders by shareholder category and by size of equity stake in 1992.































Banks 0.29 1.11 60 0.02 1.00 4 0.00 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0
Invest./pension funds 1.06 1.63 219 0.04 1.00 9 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0
Insurance companies 2.01 2.57 414 0.22 1.21 46 0.02 1.00 4 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0
Total Institutions 3.35 3.76 691 0.29 1.26 59 0.02 1.00 5 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0
Industrial companies 0.31 1.14 64 0.11 1.05 22 0.04 1.00 9 0.01 1.00 2 0.00 1.00 1
Families and indiv. 0.22 1.84 46 0.03 1.40 7 0.02 1.00 4 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0
Executive directors 0.24 1.40 49 0.14 1.38 29 0.04 1.14 8 0.00 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 0
Non-executive directors 0.26 1.71 53 0.08 1.23 16 0.02 1.00 5 0.00 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 0
Total directors 0.50 1.85 102 0.22 1.55 45 0.06 1.30 13 0.01 1.00 2 0.00 0.00 0
All shareholders 4.42 4.69 910 0.65 1.51 133 0.15 1.11 31 0.02 1.00 4 0.00 1.00 1
Note: Mean (tot.) and Mean (cat.) stand for the average stake by class of shareholder whereby the denominator is, respectively, the total number of companies
and the total number of companies with a shareholder of this category. # of invest. stands for the number of investors in this category. Source: Annual reports.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK   29
Table 3: Changes in large shareholdings by size and shareholder concentration
This table reports the number of share stake purchases and sales by size for different total shareholding
concentrations. Panel A reports the number of large new shareholdings by size class. Panel B shows the
number of increases in existing shareholdings while panel C reports the number of decreases in shareholdings.
In order to avoid picking up changes due to the decrease of disclosure threshold, the number of changes
reported in this table is the sum of the changes over the years 1990-91, 1991-92 and 1992-93. These changes
in ownership took place in 594 firm-years (the number of co ‘s in 1991, 1992 and 1993 amount to respectively
234, 206 and 154) and the number of shareholdings can be found in table 2.
Source : Own calculations with data of annual reports.
Panel A : Number of large new shareholdings by size of the new shareholding and by
total ownership concentration.
Size of new shareholdings
[3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
Total ownership concentration
<15% 67 20 7 1 2 0
[15%,25%[ 63 25 5 3 1 0
[25%,35%[ 106 41 8 3 2 0
[35%,50%[ 143 60 9 4 3 0
>50% 134 75 19 11 4 0
Total 513 221 48 22 12 0
Panel B : Number of increases in existing shareholdings by size and by total ownership
concentration
Size of increases in shareholdings
[3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
Total ownership concentration
<15% 1 1 0 2 0 0
[15%,25%[ 4 3 1 1 1 0
[25%,35%[ 9 7 1 0 0 0
[35%,50%[ 18 6 5 0 2 0
>50% 26 18 2 1 0 0
Total 58 35 9 4 3 0
Panel C : Number of decreases in existing shareholdings by size and by total ownership
concentration
Size of decreases in shareholdings
[3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
Total ownership concentration
<15% 36 12 1 1 0 0
[15%,25%[ 56 14 2 2 0 0
[25%,35%[ 101 45 6 4 0 0
[35%,50%[ 188 76 12 8 3 0
>50% 153 93 17 16 7 2
Total 534 240 38 31 10 2United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 30
Table 4 : Performance, capital structure and corporate size.
This table presents summary data on performance measures, capital structure, corporate size.
Source: Own calculations with data from LSPD and Datastream.
Panel A : Performance Sample Mean Stand. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Year 1992
Annual abnormal return (%) 224 -0.24 42.01 0.39 0.35
Return on equity (%) 217 11.76 38.80 -5.27 57.21
Cash flow margin (%) 214 6.24 16.55 -7.89 94.44
Dividends per share (p/share) 217 6.41 5.78 1.79 5.15
EBIT (£ 000) 217 45123.86 179464.84 7.48 73.53
Earnings after tax (£ 000) 206 26610.66 131166.01 5.63 53.79
Earnings per share (p/share) 207 11.93 14.31 2.64 9.97
Profit margin (%) 215 2.92 14.38 -7.10 80.18
Sum Std
Number of co's with losses 206 41 0.40
Number of co's with div. reductions 217 55 0.44
Panel B: Capital Structure Sample Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
Capital gearing (book) (%) 217 37.24 35.33 5.98 55.22
Interest coverage ratio 211 9.27 22.20 5.71 38.50
Number of co's with rights issues 211 16 0.25
Working capital ratio 215 1.49 0.70 3.68 28.20
Panel C: Company Size Sample Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis
Sales (£ 000) 208 973889.71 3598283.09 9.45 101.90
Number of employees 217 11523.85 28149.74 5.77 45.58
Notes: Annual abnormal return are calculated as deviations from its CAPM expectations with betas corrected for thin
trading; Return on equity (%) = earnings / (equity capital and reserves - total intangibles + deferred tax); Cash flow
margin (%) =  earnings + depreciation + (overseas) tax equalisation / total sales * 100; EBIT = Operating earnings before
interest payments and taxes; Profit margin = Profit/Sales; Working capital ratio = total current assets / total current
liabilities; Capital gearing (%) = (total loan capital + short term borrowings + preference capital + subordinated debt)
/(total capital employed + short term borrowings (<1j) - total intangibles - future income tax benefits).United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 31
Table 5 : Composition and structure of the board of directors and board turnover.
This table presents data on the board composition, structure and turnover.
Source: Own calculations with data of annual reports.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1988-93
Number of directors 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.6 10.2 9.5
% of executive directors 64.5% 62.6% 61.9% 60.8% 58.0% 57.2% 60.8%
% of non-executive directors 35.5% 37.4% 38.1% 39.2% 42.0% 42.8% 39.2%
CEO=chairman (1=yes) 36.6% 39.6% 37.7% 33.9% 29.2% 24.0% 33.5%
Age of CEO 51.2 52.2 52.3 53.1 53.4 53.6 52.6
Tenure of CEO 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 5.3
Age of Chairman 58.0 58.2 58.6 58.7 59.9 60.9 59.1
Tenure of Chairman 5.2 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.9 5.8
Total Turnover (%) 7.0% 8.4% 7.5% 7.1% 6.9% 7.6% 7.4%
Executive board turnover (%) 8.9% 9.5% 8.3% 8.1% 9.4% 7.9% 8.7%
Non-executive turnover (%) 3.8% 5.5% 4.9% 5.5% 3.3% 5.4% 4.7%
CEO turnover (%) 4.0% 10.7% 13.4% 12.1% 14.5% 13.5% 11.4%
Chairman turnover (%) 7.4% 9.5% 6.4% 4.4% 10.4% 8.7% 7.8%United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK   32
Table 6: The relation between ownership concentration and managerial disciplining.
This table investigates the relation between (non-natural) executive director turnover, performance and ownership concentration using Tobit models. Ownership concentration is measured






 largest stake by company and by the Shapley values of each of these stakes. Three different performance measures are calculated: annual
abnormal return, return on equity and dividend cuts and omissions (-1=yes). As control variables were included: proportion of non-executive directors, capital gearing, equity refinancing
(1=yes), change in disclosure regulation (1 for 1990 onwards) and industry dummies. The t-statistics of the parameter estimates are given below the estimated coefficients. ***, **, * stand
for significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Source: own calculations.
Dependent Variable : Executive Director Turnover.
Performance : Ann. abn. return Earnings losses ROE Cash flow margin Dividend changes
% Equity SV % Equity SV % Equity SV % Equity SV % Equity SV
Intercept 0.045734** 0.119496** 0.245694*** 0.293565*** 0.055347*** 0.111918** 0.063589*** 0.113545** 0.063819*** 0.097039**
t-stat 2.43 2.33 8.97 5.58 2.97 2.28 3.40 2.27 3.28 1.99
Largest 0.056816 -0.053639 0.034944 -0.046811 0.062518 -0.03879 0.054863 -0.032127 0.02898 -0.026503
t-stat 1.14 -1.06 0.74 -0.96 1.31 -0.79 1.15 -0.65 0.53 -0.56
2nd largest 0.158111 -0.174426 0.071852 -0.18316 0.152801 -0.177722 0.174754 -0.182093 0.00565 -0.094614
t-stat 1.28 -1.48 0.56 -1.57 1.28 -1.48 1.45 -1.51 0.03 -0.82
3rd largest -0.400849* -0.004717 -0.453439** 0.004467 -0.516331** -0.003433 -0.493301** 0.017307 -0.23894 -0.033426
t-stat -1.95 -0.04 -2.08 0.04 -2.46 -0.03 -2.33 0.14 -0.86 -0.27
4th largest 0.544667* 0.012235 0.506902 0.010567 0.495241 0.01208 0.499275 0.02167 0.252501 0.059157
t-stat 1.70 0.13 1.59 0.11 1.54 0.13 1.50 0.22 0.62 0.57
5th largest -0.244246 -0.122379 -0.332485 -0.135034 -0.178967 -0.07882 -0.287062 -0.084495 0.130685 -0.035656
t-stat -0.87 -0.75 -1.22 -0.90 -0.64 -0.51 -0.98 -0.55 0.38 -0.23
Performance at t-2 -0.000313*** -0.000317*** -0.053333*** -0.048579*** -0.000046 -0.000053 0.002053*** 0.002085*** 0.006675 0.005925
t-stat -3.23 -3.33 -4.08 -3.72 -0.55 -0.68 4.73 4.82 0.77 0.70
Performance at t-1 -0.000587*** -0.000596*** -0.054902*** -0.054067*** -0.000169*** -0.000166*** -0.002286*** -0.002124*** -0.041514*** -0.041362***
t-stat -4.84 -4.96 -4.00 -3.93 -3.95 -3.73 -3.76 -3.52 -4.78 -4.70
Performance at t -0.00028*** -0.000283*** -0.076361*** -0.077816*** -0.0001*** -0.000097*** -0.001658** -0.001849*** -0.036599*** -0.036509***
t-stat -2.74 -2.72 -6.13 -6.24 -3.32 -3.35 -2.54 -2.85 -3.96 -3.98
Control Variables t-1:
Prop. non-executives -0.024734 -0.022884 -0.029112 -0.025456 -0.025598 -0.023548 -0.013913 -0.011596 -0.048577* -0.046051*
t-stat -0.82 -0.75 -0.98 -0.84 -0.83 -0.76 -0.44 -0.37 -1.80 -1.70
Unitary supervision (1=yes) 0.014327 0.012167 0.009375 0.006957 0.013987 0.011574 0.015735 0.013437 0.013034 0.012045
t-stat 1.43 1.23 0.96 0.72 1.39 1.17 1.57 1.37 1.23 1.14
Capital gearing 0.000464** 0.000444** 0.000299 0.000351* 0.000712*** 0.000751*** 0.000546*** 0.000577*** 0.000633*** 0.000644***
t-stat 2.28 2.19 1.58 1.85 3.87 4.05 2.81 2.92 2.92 2.98
Liquidity -0.000018 -0.000026 -0.000007 -0.000011 -0.000021 -0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000032 0.000036 0.000034
t-stat -0.29 -0.46 -0.11 -0.19 -0.32 -0.45 -0.39 -0.54 0.36 0.36
Refinancing (1=yes) 0.043597*** 0.043885*** 0.035369*** 0.035793*** 0.030622*** 0.030475*** 0.029732** 0.030072** 0.009816 0.009724
t-stat 3.70 3.79 3.03 3.07 2.64 2.67 2.39 2.45 0.63 0.63
Change in disclosure 0.023422** 0.026834** 0.016469 0.019944** 0.009678 0.012775 0.015687 0.019103* 0.032955*** 0.034355***
t-stat 1.99 2.35 1.64 1.99 0.96 1.28 1.48 1.79 2.60 2.76
Observations 1015 1033 1060 1042 816United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK   33
Table 7 : The relation between ownership concentration and managerial disciplining.
This table shows Tobit models exploring the relation between (non-natural) executive director turnover, performance and
ownership concentration and its distribution over different categories of shareholders. Control is measured by the equity stake held
by the largest shareholder by category of owner (%Eqlargest). For these largest shareholders by category, the relative voting power




, all substantial ownership stakes first are summed by category of
owner and subsequently the SV of these combined shareholdings is calculated. Thus, SVcategory
i
 captures the relative voting power
of a category. Seven different classes of owner are included: banks, investment and pension funds, insurance co’s, industrial and
commercial co’s, individuals and families, executive and non-executive directors. Equity blocks held by governmental institutions
or real estate co’s were not included because they only few minor stakes. Six different performance measures are calculated: annual
abnormal return, operational return on assets, earnings losses (-1=yes), return on equity (after interest and taxes), cash flow margin
(cash flow/sales) and dividend cuts and omissions (-1=yes). As control variables were included: proportion of non-executive
directors, unitary board supervision (dummy indicating whether the Chairman is the same person as the CEO (1=yes)), capital
gearing, liquidity (interest coverage), refinancing via new equity issues (1=yes), change in disclosure regulation (1 for ’90
onwards). ***, **, * stands for statistical significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% level. T-statistics are given below the
parameter estimates (between brackets). Source: own calculations.
Dependent Variable : Executive Director Turnover.
Performance
:
Annual abnormal return Operational ROA Earnings losses
% Eq.largest SVlargest/cat
i SVcategory
I % Eq.largest SVlargest/cat
i
SVcategory




Intercept 0.05221 0.06177 0.07895 0.06190*** 0.08040*** 0.07930*** 0.23459*** 0.24133*** 0.25061***
t-stat (2.89) (3.24) (4.68) (3.24) (4.03) (4.36) (8.38) (8.86) (9.67)
Exec. dir. -0.04859 -0.03749*** -0.04579*** -0.07410* -0.05640*** -0.05110*** -0.09046** -0.05321*** -0.05768***
t-stat (-1.24) (-2.55) (-2.89) (-1.84) (-3.78) (-3.23) (-2.46) (-3.72) (-3.80)
Non-ex. dir. 0.01197 -0.02300 -0.03715* 0.00616 -0.02920* -0.03600* -0.00771 -0.02792* -0.04583**
t-stat (0.25) (-1.43) (-1.85) (0.13) (-1.79) (-1.74) (-0.16) (-1.79) (-2.28)
Banks 0.05250 0.03561 0.04923 0.01280 0.02170 0.03380 0.03405 0.03880 0.03805
t-stat (0.38) (0.80) (0.97) (0.09) (0.55) (0.79) (0.26) (1.03) (0.96)
Invest/pensio -0.05193 0.02725** 0.01285 -0.14300** 0.01700 0.01810 -0.08683 0.02154* 0.01282
Funds   t-stat (-0.75) (2.27) (0.77) (-2.03) (1.35) (1.04) (-1.28) (1.74) (0.78)
Insur. co’s 0.11060*** 0.04111*** 0.07135*** 0.10010*** 0.02600** 0.06990*** 0.06520** 0.02537** 0.05862***
t-stat (3.53) (3.59) (5.12) (3.05) (2.28) (4.89) (1.98) (2.22) (4.26)
Industr. co’s 0.07935** 0.04957*** 0.04578*** 0.09390** 0.05340*** 0.06450*** 0.05919 0.04462*** 0.04772***
t-stat (2.17) (4.09) (3.23) (2.56) (4.25) (4.53) (1.46) (3.52) (3.32)
Indiv./famil. 0.07334 0.02042 0.03293 0.05070 0.00632 0.03940 0.03121 -0.00524 0.02517
t-stat (1.41) (0.88) (1.08) (0.87) (0.24) (1.16) (0.57) (-0.21) (0.85)
Perfor. at t-2 -0.00030*** -0.00030*** -0.00033*** 0.00774 -0.00993 -0.03413*** -0.04884*** -0.04446*** -0.04632***
t-stat (-3.28) (-3.35) (-3.76) (0.79) (-1.03) (-3.63) (-3.44) (-3.10) (-3.40)
Perfor. at t-1 -0.00057*** -0.00058*** -0.00057*** 0.00778*** 0.08515*** 0.11052*** -0.05048*** -0.04612*** -0.04852***
t-stat (-4.86) (-4.92) (-5.05) (5.90) (6.62) (8.75) (-3.59) (-3.25) (-3.57)
Perfor. at t -0.00030*** -0.00030*** -0.00026*** -0.13506*** -0.14067*** -0.14001*** -0.07322*** -0.07765*** -0.07481***
t-stat (-2.97) (-3.00) (-2.67) (-11.72) (-12.50) (-12.70) (-5.75) (-6.08) (-5.95)
Prop. non-ex -0.03774 -0.052851*** -0.06018*** -0.03500 -0.05320** -0.05800*** -0.03366 -0.04879* -0.05518**
t-stat (-1.35) (-2.20) (-2.91) (-1.21) (-2.22) (-2.69) (-1.18) (-1.93) (-2.50)
Unit.Superv. 0.009566 0.01072 0.01015 0.00978 0.01040 0.01050 0.00688 0.00732 0.00733
t-stat (1.01) (1.16) (1.11) (0.96) (1.04) (1.06) (0.70) (0.76) (0.77)
Cap.gearing 0.00048** 0.00038* 0.0003* 0.00066*** 0.00059*** 0.00059*** 0.00030 0.00023 0.00023
t-stat (2.39) (1.91) (1.79) (3.42) (3.00) (3.15) (1.55) (1.24) (1.21)
Liquidity -0.00001*** 0.00002 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00003 0.00003
t-stat (-0.13) (0.32) (0.35) (-0.30) (0.06) (0.12) (0.04) (0.44) (0.49)
Refinancing 0.04037*** 0.03492*** 0.03572*** 0.02890** 0.02250** 0.02380** 0.02936** 0.02421** 0.02475**
t-stat (3.61) (3.26) (3.36) (2.50) (2.02) (2.19) (2.56) (2.19) (2.27)
D disclosure 0.02584*** 0.02996*** 0.02357*** 0.01640* 0.02220** 0.01650* 0.02191** 0.02873*** 0.02333***
t-stat (2.41) (2.93) (2.43) (1.67) (2.36) (1.84) (2.23) (3.07) (2.65)
Log Likelih. 1719.855 1737.754 1748.97 1706.536 1727.229 1737.656 1734.915 1756.449 1767.591
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Table 7 continued.
Dependent Variable : Executive Director Turnover.
Performance
:




i % Eq.largest SVlargest/cat
i
SVcategory
i % Eq.largest SVlargest/cat
i SVcategory
i
Intercept 0.06073*** 0.08206*** 0.08360*** 0.07005*** 0.09430*** 0.09706*** 0.069898*** 0.07183*** 0.08440***
t-stat (3.23) (4.19) (4.61) (3.69) (4.76) (5.20) -(4.10) (3.50) (4.55)
Exec. dir. -0.07441* -0.05909*** -0.05580*** -0.09055** -0.06157*** -0.06142*** -0.076083** -0.04009** -0.04126**
t-stat (-1.87) (-4.00) (-3.55) (-2.25) (-4.20) (-3.88) -(2.02) (-2.44) (-2.37)
Non-ex.dir.. 0.00575 -0.02944* -0.04010** 0.00810 -0.02855* -0.04093** 0.077069 -0.00296 -0.02486
t-stat (0.12) (-1.82) (-1.98) (0.17) (-1.81) (-2.04) (1.59) (-0.17) (-1.11)
Banks 0.01234 0.02015 0.03498 -0.00399 0.02907 0.03855 0.041549 0.05321 0.06814*
t-stat (0.09) (0.52) (0.82) (-0.03) (0.76) (0.93) (0.33) (1.46) (1.85)
Invest/pensio -0.13716** 0.01175 0.00738 -0.08914 0.01743 0.01167 -0.126736* 0.02615* 0.01489
Funds   t-stat (-1.98) (0.96) (0.44) (-1.28) (1.43) (0.70) -(1.73) (1.77) (0.64)
Insur. co’s 0.10604*** 0.02550** 0.06438*** 0.09745*** 0.02817** 0.06396*** 0.130157*** 0.04216*** 0.08077***
t-stat (3.30) (2.28) (4.64) (2.99) (2.55) (4.66) (3.52) (3.05) (5.36)
Industr. co’s 0.08716** 0.04427*** 0.05286*** 0.09888*** 0.05437*** 0.05663*** 0.02268 0.02901* 0.02198
t-stat (2.41) (3.62) (3.86) (2.70) (4.28) (3.91) (0.54) (1.89) (1.21)
Indiv/ famil. 0.06293 0.01173 0.03448 0.03849 -0.00361 0.02248 0.032641 0.00163 0.03766
t-stat (1.14) (0.47) (1.04) (0.68) (-0.14) (0.72) (0.58) (0.05) (0.58)
Perfor. At t-2 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 0.00218*** 0.00200*** 0.00201*** 0.001938 0.00601 0.00832
t-stat (-0.50) (-0.52) (-0.61) (5.06) (4.40) (4.45) (0.22) (0.80) (1.13)
Perfor. At t-1 -0.00006** -0.00005* -0.00005** -0.00218*** -0.00212*** -0.00207*** -0.035818*** -0.03337*** -0.02997***
t-stat (-2.05) (-1.85) (-2.01) (-3.57) (-3.34) (-3.45) -(3.04) (-3.73) (-3.70)
Perfor. At t -0.00008*** -0.00008*** -0.00008*** -0.00182*** -0.00223*** -0.00218*** -0.03891*** -0.04028*** -0.03778***
t-stat (-2.78) (-3.05) (-3.18) (-2.86) (-3.53) (-3.62) -(3.51) (-4.68) (-4.48)
Prop. non-ex -0.03441 -0.05372** -0.05842** -0.02404 -0.04008 -0.04494* -0.065265*** -0.07389*** -0.07937***
t-stat (-1.17) (-2.14) (-2.57) (-0.80) (-1.47) (-1.81) -(2.79) (-3.71) (-4.67)
Unit. Superv. 0.01018 0.01185 0.01121 0.01218 0.01369 0.01336 0.006227 0.00673 0.00731
t-stat (1.03) (1.22) (1.17) (1.24) (1.41) (1.40) (0.68) (0.65) (0.73)
Cap. gearing 0.00069*** 0.00062*** 0.00061*** 0.00051** 0.00038* 0.00040** 0.000673*** 0.00056** 0.00051**
t-stat (3.64) (3.22) (3.27) (2.53) (1.94) (2.03) (3.17) (2.55) (2.34)
Liquidity -0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.000057 0.00008 0.00007
t-stat (-0.19) (0.20) (0.26) (-0.17) (0.22) (0.25) (0.88) (0.78) (0.74)
Refinancing 0.02701** 0.02114* 0.02198** 0.02601** 0.02026* 0.02153* 0.007035 0.00249 0.00239
t-stat (2.36) (1.92) (2.04) (2.16) (1.73) (1.90) (0.53) (0.18) (0.17)
D disclosure 0.01564 0.02052** 0.01551* 0.02285** 0.02854*** 0.02327** 0.027557** 0.03230*** 0.024817**
t-stat (1.63) (2.25) (1.79) (2.24) (2.93) (2.52) (2.37) (2.76) (2.25)
Log Likelih. 1751.1 1770.864 1781.278 1731.413 1755.815 1764.987 1394.302 1401.959 1414.6584
Observations 1171 1152 882United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK   35
Table 8: Alternative corporate governance mechanism and their disciplinary role.
This table shows Tobit models exploring the relation between (non-natural) executive board turnover, performance and alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Ownership
concentration is measured by summing all substantial ownership by category of owner and by subsequently computing the Shapley Values of these combined share stakes (SVcategory
i). As
such, the relative voting power by category of owner is calculated. Seven different classes of owner are included: banks, investment and pension funds, insurance co’s, industrial and
commercial co’s, individuals and families, executive and non-executive directors. Equity blocks held by governmental institutions or real estate co’s were not included because there are
only minor stakes. Five different performance measures are calculated: annual abnormal return, earnings losses (-1=yes), return on equity, cash flow margin and dividend cuts and
omissions (-1=yes). Changes in shareholdings are gross changes; the increases of existing and new shareholders are summed by category of owner. Proportion of non-executive directors
stands for number of non-executives/total number of directors on board. Unitary supervision means that the functions of chairman and CEO are held by one person (dummy which equals
one if Chairman=CEO). Capital gearing is debt/total assets, liquidity is interest coverage, equity refinancing stands new equity issues (1=yes), size is the logarithm of total assets and
change in disclosure threshold is the reduction of 5% to 3% in 1989 (dummy). All variables are interacted with performance at t-1. The t-statistics are given next to the parameter
coefficients. ***, **, * stands for significance at respectively the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
x denotes that this parameter estimate is multiplied by 1 million. Source: own calculations.
Dependent Variable : Executive Director Turnover.
Par.Est. t-stat Par.Est. t-stat Par.Est. t-stat Par.Est. t-stat Par.Est. t-stat Par.Est. t-stat
Intercept   0.06710*** (3.23)   0.05820*** (2.89)   0.21390** (1.97)   0.07850*** (2.95)   0.03310 (0.95)   0.06330*** (2.93)
Performance An. Abn. Return Operational ROA Losses (1=yes) ROE Cash flow margin Dividend changes
Performance t-2  -0.00042*** (-3.61)  -0.00229*** (-3.35)   -0.0312* (-1.87)  -0.00002 (-0.23)   0.00229*** (4.45)   0.00918 (1.23)
Performance t-1   0.00053 (0.90)  -0.01630 (-1.21)   -0.0493 (-0.45)  -0.00065 (-0.73)   0.00320 (0.96)   0.06840 (0.85)
Performance t  -0.00020* (-1.84)   0.00005 (0.04)   -0.0634*** (-4.44)  -0.00010*** (-3.85)  -0.00166** (-2.19)  -0.03150*** (-3.35)




Executives  -0.0497** (-2.46)  -0.0444** (-2.36)  -0.1393 (-1.55)  -0.0649*** (-2.90)  -0.0446 (-1.56)  -0.0546*** (-2.61)
Non-executives  -0.0495* (-1.89)  -0.0348 (-1.40)  -0.1437* (-1.66)  -0.0277 (-1.14)  -0.0149 (-0.43)  -0.0392* (-1.65)
Institutional ownership: SVcategory
i
Bank managed funds   0.0422 (0.84)   0.0599 (1.41)  -0.1507 (0.81)   0.0732 (1.03)   0.1084 (1.00)   0.047 (0.88)
Investm./pension funds   0.0211 (0.81)   0.0208 (0.80)   0.0297 (0.19)   0.0122 (0.49)   0.0804* (1.81)   0.0358 (1.42)
Insurers managed funds   0.0674*** (4.03)   0.0857*** (5.41)  -0.0062 (-0.08)   0.0694*** (3.92)   0.0992*** (4.20)   0.0871*** (5.02)
Corporate and indiv. ownership: SVcategory
i
Companies   0.0239 (1.20)   0.0393** (1.98)  -0.0451 (-0.54)   0.0535** (2.56)   0.0445* (1.65)   0.0363* (1.81)
Individuals and families  -0.0162 (-0.36)   0.0130 (0.27)  -0.2037 (0.00)   0.00450 (0.06)  -0.0224 (-0.26)  -0.0257 (-0.48)
Changes in voting rights (%) (t-1,t)
Institutions  0.000353 (0.67)  0.000121 (0.26)  -0.00329 (-1.63)  0.000374 (0.68)  0.001032 (1.61)  0.000664 (1.33)
Companies  0.000781 (0.71)  0.002089** (2.40)   0.01200*** (4.57)  0.002336*** (2.73)  0.002481** (2.47)  0.000565 (0.51)
Individuals and families  0.003738** (2.02)  0.004032*** (2.76)   0.003625 (0.20)  0.002854* (1.66)  0.000611 (0.37)  0.003586* (1.92)
Executives  0.006292*** (4.80)  0.005202*** (4.32)   0.006145*** (2.66)  0.005275*** (2.70)  0.004892** (2.43)  0.006374*** (3.91)
Non-executives  0.004719*** (2.61)  0.005151*** (3.61)   0.006354 (0.42)  0.004809*** (2.60)  0.000019 (0.01)  0.004721*** (3.50)
Internal control (t-1)
Non-execs on board  -0.0540** (-2.53)  -0.0586*** (-2.75)   0.1086 (0.78)  -0.108*** (-2.85)  -0.0008 (-0.02)  -0.0589*** (-2.70)
Unitary supervision   0.0073 (0.70)   0.0044 (0.45)  -0.0236 (-0.49)   0.0196 (1.47)   0.0147 (0.93)   0.0097 (0.88)
Capital Structure
Capital Gearing (t-1)   0.000275 (1.14)   0.00071*** (3.64)   0.000543 (1.00)   0.000856*** (4.53)   0.000658*** (3.66)   0.000576** (2.55)
Liquidity (t-1)   0.000053 (0.59)   0.000049 (0.62)   0.000054 (0.63)   0.000056 (0.64)   0.000062 (0.62)   0.000054 (0.63)
Refinancing  (t)   0.038200*** (3.01)  -0.003752 (-0.37)  -0.13500*** (-3.60)  -0.000646 (-1.63)  -0.002225 (-1.31)   0.04470 (0.97)United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 36
Table 8 continued
Size (ln total sales) (t-1)
x  -0.001311 (-0.84)  -0.001319 (-0.86)  -0.001517 (-0.122)  -0.001555** (-0.215)   -0.001692 (-1.11)  -0.001549 (-1.12)
D in disclosure threshold   0.0292** (2.36)   0.0204* (1.94)    0.0267** (2.54)    0.0207* (1.91)   0.0239** (2.14)    0.0277** (2.35)
Variables interacted with performance at t-1




Executives   0.000235 (0.40)   0.01010 (0.98)   0.08910 (0.97)   0.000575 (0.70)   -0.001064 (-0.39)   0.03430 (0.49)
Non-executives  -0.000454 (-0.71)  -0.00222 (-0.14)   0.10840 (1.17)  -0.000402 (-0.48)   -0.002971 (-0.62)   0.01860 (0.27)
Institutional ownership: SVcategory
i
Bank managed funds  -0.000599 (-0.37)  -0.00387 (-0.04)   0.20750 (0.38)  -0.000199 (-0.08)   -0.005226 (-0.36)   0.1947 (0.77)
Investm./pension funds  -0.000707 (-0.98)  -0.02120 (-0.99)   0.00166 (0.01)   0.000462 (0.73)   -0.005367 (-1.18)  -0.1738* (-1.89)
Insurers managed funds  -0.001670*** (-3.01)   0.01510* (1.76)   0.08740 (1.15)   0.001033* (1.94)   -0.00102 (-0.45)  -0.0833* (-1.71)
Corporate and individual ownership: SVcategory
i
Companies  -0.00196** (-1.99)  -0.05881* (-1.72)   0.08010 (0.94)  -0.000951* (-1.65)   -0.009431** (-1.94)  -0.1287** (-1.99)
Individuals and families  -0.000031 (-0.03)   0.01110 (0.26)   0.20460 (0.00)   0.000385 (0.09)   -0.000976 (-0.10)   0.0695 (0.16)
Changes in voting rights (%) at (t-1,t)
Institutions   0.000009 (0.64)  -0.001109 (-0.68)   0.000324 (0.02)   0.00008 (0.98)   0.000819*** (2.76)  -0.003535 (-0.20)
Companies  -0.000114** (-1.66)   0.000295 (0.31)  -0.020225* (-2.10)   0.000043 (0.48)   0.000183 (0.64)  -0.012371* (-1.95)
Individuals and families  -0.000104** (-2.42)   0.000266 (0.26)  -0.001738 (-0.11)  -0.000002 (-0.01)   0.000806** (2.20)  -0.001121 (-0.24)
Executives   0.000043 (0.89)   0.002377 (0.33)   0.019200* (1.82)   0.000595* (1.92)   0.00109 (1.10)  -0.009445 (-0.25)
Non-executives  -0.000032 (-0.51)  -0.000016 (-0.13)  -0.000297 (-0.51)   0.000003*** (3.90)  -0.000027 (-1.61)  -0.00084 (-0.95)
Internal control (t-1)
Non-exec. dir. on board   0.000101 (0.11)  -0.00097*** (-3.35)   0.003804* (1.83)  -0.00001 (-0.59)  -0.000121** (-2.00)  -0.001226 (-0.58)
Unitary supervision -0.000137 (-0.39)   0.03680* (1.69)  -0.18590 (-1.32)   0.001012 (1.18)  -0.005924 (-1.30)  -0.0972 (-0.74)
Capital Structure
Capital Gearing (t-1)  -0.000016*** (-3.24)   0.00041 (0.55)  -0.0125*** (-4.37)  -0.000027 (-0.98)  -0.000079 (-1.03)  -0.005315 (-1.46)
Liquidity (t-1)  -0.000221 (-0.77)   0.00492 (0.71)   0.0270 (0.55)  -0.000564 (-1.00)  -0.00118 (-0.76)  -0.0396 (-1.00)
Refinancing (t)   0.000062 (0.17)   0.03110*** (2.65)   0.1501*** (4.27)   0.031900** (2.30)   0.03800** (2.36)  -0.001596 (-0.11)
Log Likelihood 1473.286 1497.054 1530.47 1514.367 1500.245 1410.609
Observations 906 930 939 949 930 854United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 37
 APPENDIX :
Table A1 : Concentration of voting rights by country.
This table presents total ownership concentration of all large shareholders (defined as shareholders with stakes exceeding the disclosure threshold) and of the largest
shareholder. The most important ownership classes (in terms of cumulative ownership) are also exhibited.
Ownership data capture both direct and indirect shareholdings: all voting rights controlled directly and indirectly possibly via a cascade of intermediate holding
Companies are added. In other words, alliances based on share stakes are taken into account.
The companies in these studies are listed and exclude financial institutions.
Studies Sample co's Disclosure Total ownership concentr. Largest shareholding Shareholder classes with
Eur.Corp.Governance Network All quoted Threshold Mean Median Mean Median largest number of voting rights
Most 2nd most
Austria Gugler, Kalss, Stomper, Zechner 50 listed (all) 5% 65.5 60.0 54.1 52.0 Domestic co's For. co's/bks
Belgium Becht and Renneboog 150 listed (all) 5% 63.4 66.5 55.8 55.5 (Fin)Holding co's Ind&com Co's
France Bloch and Kemp 40 listed (CAC) (1) 5% 52.0 30.0 29.4 20.0 Fin. holding co's Ind&com Co's
Germany Becht and Boehmer 374 listed (all) (3) 5% <65% <65% n.a. 52.1 Companies Fin. Inst.
Italy Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques 216 listed (all) 2% 68.4 62.3 51.9 54.5 Companies Individuals
Netherlands De Jong, Kabir, Mara and 137 listed (all) 5% 62.5 69.8 42.8 43.5 Administr. office Fin. Inst.
Spain Crespi and Garcia-Cestona 193 listed (all) 5% 65.1 63.2 40.1 34.2 Domestic co's Foreign co's
UK Goergen and Renneboog 250 listed (2) 3% 40.8 39.0 15.2 10.9 Institutions Directors
US Becht 1309 (NYSE) 5% ca 30% n.a. <5% <5% Institutions Individuals
All studies are forthcoming in Barca and Becht (2000):’Who controls corporate Europe?’ Oxford Univ. Press
Note: (1) for all 680 French listed firms, the largest owner controls an average of 56% of voting rights.
(2) random sample of all non-financial firms listed on the LSE.
(3) all listed from the official market. For comparison; the median largest voting block of a DAX30 company amounts to 11.0%.United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK   38
Table A2: Ownership distribution of largest shareholders in western economies.
This table gives the total large share holdings (over >3% or >5%; see table 1 of appendix) held by different investors classes. For all
countries the ownership data cover the year 1996, except for Belgium (1994) and UK (1993).
Holding and
Individuals Banks Insurance Investm. Industrial State Directors
1996 Sample Ownership and families companies funds Companies
France 402 (2) 15.5 16.0 3.5 0.0 34.5 1.0 0.0
Austria 600 (2) 38.6 5.6 0.0 0.0 33.9 11.7 0.0
Italy (1) (2) 68.6 7.2 0.0 0.0 24.2 0.0 (4) 0.0
Netherlands 137 (3) 10.8 7.2 2.4 16.1 10.9 1.3 0.0
Spain 394 (2) 21.8 6.6 8.8 0.0 32.6 0.0 0.0
Belgium 155 (2) 15.6 0.4 1.0 3.8 37.5 0.3 0.0
UK 248 (3) 2.4 1.1 4.7 11.0 5.9 0.0 11.3
Germany 402 (2) 7.4 1.2 0.2 0.0 21.0 0.7 0.0
Note (1) : numbers for Italy refer to both listed and non-listed companies; for other countries only listed companies
Are taken;  (2) : both direct and indirect shareholdings are considered; (3) : only direct shareholdings.
(4) : Of the listed Italian companies about 25% are directly and indirectly controlled by state holdings; this  is
Classified in previous column under (State) Holdings and industrial holdings
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Table A3 : Number of new large shareholdings and changes in existing share stakes by shareholder category
This table reports the number of share stake sales by size for different total shareholding concentrations and for categories of owner. Panel A reports the number of large new shareholdings by size class.
Panel B shows the number of increases in existing shareholdings while panel C reports the number of decreases in shareholdings. The number of changes is the sum of the changes over the years 1990-
91, 1991-92 and 1992-93. The sample size for the changes in share stakes over the period 1990-1991, is 243 companies :
Share ownership data are collected from annual reports.
Panel A : Number of changes in shareholdings held by institutional investors by size of the change and by total ownership concentration
new shareholdings increases existing share stakes decreases in share stakes
Total ownership [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
concentration
<15% 72 19 7 1 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 42 15 1 1 0 0
[15%,25%[ 64 20 6 1 1 0 5 3 1 1 0 0 60 18 1 0 0 0
[25%,35%[ 64 20 5 1 0 0 4 3 1 1 0 0 60 18 1 0 0 0
[35%,50%[ 133 50 3 0 1 0 12 5 2 0 1 0 165 60 5 4 0 0
>50% 110 59 10 4 1 0 15 9 2 1 0 0 117 55 4 6 3 1
Total 443 168 31 7 5 0 39 22 6 3 1 0 444 166 12 11 3 1
Panel B : Number of changes in shareholdings held by industrial and commercial companies by size of change and by total ownership concentration
new shareholdings increases existing share stakes decreases in share stakes
Total ownership [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
concentration
<15% 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0
[15%,25%[ 3 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
[25%,35%[ 11 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 6 1 2 0 0
[35%,50%[ 10 5 6 1 2 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 17 10 4 1 3 0
>50% 9 10 2 3 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 5 10 4 2 1 1
Total 34 24 9 6 5 0 6 4 1 1 0 0 33 27 9 7 4 1
Panel C : Number of changes in shareholdings held by individuals and families by size of change and by total ownership concentration
new shareholdings increases existing share stakes decreases in share stakes
Total ownership [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
concentration
<15% 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
[15%,25%[ 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
[25%,35%[ 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 0 0 0
[35%,50%[ 2 4 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 5 0 1 0 0
>50% 13 9 3 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 12 8 1 0 0 0
Total 22 19 3 3 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 19 17 3 1 0 0United we stand: corporate monitoring by shareholder coalitions in the UK 40
Panel D : Number of changes in shareholdings held by non-executive directors by size of change and by total ownership concentration
new shareholdings increases existing share stakes decreases in share stakes
Total ownership [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
concentration
<15% 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[15%,25%[ 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
[25%,35%[ 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[35%,50%[ 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 0
>50% 6 3 3 3 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 14 8 5 2 1 0
Total 12 5 3 4 0 0 5 1 1 1 1 0 16 11 6 2 1 0
Panel E : Number of changes in shareholdings held by executive directors by size of change and by total ownership concentration
new shareholdings increases existing share stakes decreases in share stakes
Total ownership [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50% [3-5%[ [5-10%[ [10-15%[ [15-25%[ [25-50%[ >50%
concentration
<15% 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[15%,25%[ 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
[25%,35%[ 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0
[35%,50%[ 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 7 1 2 2 0 0
>50% 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 13 15 3 6 2 0
Total 2 5 2 2 0 0 7 6 0 0 1 0 22 19 5 9 2 0